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The Philosopher-Priest and the Mythology of Reason
John Panteleimon Manoussakis
Though much of ideology’s dangers for religion have been the subject of recent
scholarly discussion, ranging from religion’s ontological commitments to its selfcaptivity in the land of conceptual idolatry, far less noticed has remained, to the
scholarly eye in any case, the counter risk of philosophy’s aspirations to usurp the
salvific role of religion. Lofty aspirations which, although never quite admitted as
such, are kept hidden under what philosophy has always, or almost always,
considered as its principal duty: namely, the supersession (read, incorporation or
substitution1) of religion by one or the other speculative systems.
This, in fact, was an accusation brought against philosophy (and philosophers)
by none other than Nietzsche who, in his work appropriately named Twilight of the
Idols, writes:
All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been
concept-mummies [Begriffs-Mumien]; nothing real escaped their grasp
alive. When these honorable idolaters of concepts [diese Herren
Begriffs-Götzendiener] worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they
threaten the life of everything they worship.2
It is important to pay attention to Nietzsche’s language. He speaks of a worship to
which philosophers have dedicated themselves “for thousands of years”; but this is
not the worship of the living God, “the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob” to
use Pascal’s terms, but, as one might indeed expect, the “God of the philosophers.”
Nietzsche is more accurate in his description: it is an idol, that is, a dead or
counterfeit god. But how could a god die, as the madman of Nietzsche’s Gay
Science in so powerful a way declares?3 Religion, pagan and Abrahamic alike, has
taught us that if man were to see god, man would die. “You cannot see my face, for
no one may see me and live,” Yahweh says to Moses (Exodus 33:20). In philosophy
1
We will return to these two terms later when discussing Patočka’s Heretical Essays on the Philosophy
of History and Derrida’s reading of them.
2
Nietzsche, Twilights of the Idols, section 1: “Reason in Philosophy”; from The Portable Nietzsche, ed.
and trans. Walter Kaufmann (Penguin Books, 1982), 479.
3
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, book III, section 125.

this principle becomes reversed: when man sees god, god dies. And he dies by
means of this very “seeing,” by means, in other words, of what we know in Greek as
the idea, and in German as Begriff. It is, at once, the crime and the means of that
crime that Nietzsche identified by calling the philosopher an “idolater of concepts.”
Far from being a criticism of a religion not credible any more, as it is often assumed,
Nietzsche’s proclamation of “the death of God” is a powerful condemnation of
philosophy—at least of that philosophy which by means of the pure concept sought
to re-establish a new Good Friday on the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit. Even if such
Golgotha was newly situated in Jena.
Hegel’s demand, which is at the same time nothing less than a programmatic
declaration, that the pure concept “re-establish for philosophy . . . the speculative
Good Friday in place of the historic Good Friday”4 is well known. It is with such a
prophetic tenor that he closes his early essay on “Faith and Knowledge”—the title of
which is not fully understood unless seen under the prism of this very demand. The
new philosophy, the only one worthy to be called a philosophy, that is, speculative
philosophy, is precisely a philosophy which would encompass all three of the
concepts in the title of that essay, namely, “knowledge,” to which the reflective
philosophy of Kant, Jacobi and even Fichte had limited itself to; “faith” which of
course here doesn’t quite mean historical religion but rather the metaphysical claims
which the “Copernican revolution” of Kant had abdicated; and, above all, the
synthetic conjunction “and,” of which we could say is here, for the first time,
elevated to the dignity of a concept.
In the five years between 1802 and 1807, the promise that speculative
philosophy could and, indeed, should replace the historical Good Friday with
another of its own was fulfilled in the “Golgotha of Absolute Spirit” at which the
Phenomenology finds its culmination. In doing so, philosophy proclaims itself not
only as absolute knowledge, but also as absolute faith, that is, philosophy has
become religion.
These are, of course, well known facts and one hardly needs to be reminded
of them. As are also known the implications of religion’s appropriation by
philosophy—for both, philosophy and religion. The question with which I propose
to occupy myself in these pages is whether Hegel was the first to commit this crime;
whether his ambition to eclipse historical religion for the sake of a higher form—
which, incidentally, he recognized in his own system—was in fact unprecedented.
Certainly, there are developments in the history of philosophy prior to Hegel
that lead, as through a predictable via dolorosa, toward the speculative Golgotha of
Absolute Spirit. Was not, after all, the wish for a gradual overcoming of revealed
religion by the “religion of reason” as in Kant’s religion of morality which Kant
himself hailed as God’s true kingdom on earth?5 And did not Fichte’s Attempt at a
Critique of All Revelation set the regulations by which this overcoming was to take
4
Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris, (Albany: State University of New
York, 1977), 191 (my emphasis).
5
Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, section VII of the Third Part “The Gradual
Transition of Ecclesiastical Faith Toward the Exclusive Dominion of Pure Religious Faith is the
Coming of the Kingdom of God” (6:115ff).
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place? And beyond the immediate scope of philosophy if one were to look at the
cultural atmosphere of the times—was not historical religion, in fact, first displaced
and then replaced by an ad hoc created cult of nature and reason as demanded by the
Republic of Virtue, as it called itself, but became better known in history as the
Reign of Terror? It was precisely what the Enlightenment had detested most deeply,
namely, the irrational orgiastic, that triumphantly returned in the consecration of the
secular that, naturally, according to a certain logic, followed the profanation of the
sacred.6
The accomplishment of religion’s complete appropriation by philosophy,
which constitutes at the same time its highest moment and its highest form,
coincides with, or rather emerges from, the depths of the grief of the proclamation
that “God is dead.” Hegel sees the death of God—the death of the historical
specificity of this God out of which the spiritual God emerges, that is, God as Spirit:
Geist, but also Begriff—in counterpoint to “the death of the philosophy”7 which was,
in his eyes, brought about by the perpetuation and the solidification of the distinction
(epistemological, methodological) between faith and knowledge, revelation and
reason.
It was as if God had to die for philosophy to live, and for God to live
(undisturbed by philosophy’s claims?), philosophy would have to die the death that
turned her into mere reason, that is, understanding (der Verstand). Situated between
these two deaths—God’s and philosophy’s—I propose revisiting the archetypal
death scene in Plato’s Phaedo.
Plato’s Speculative Good Friday
It is Patočka who credits Plato with the invention of religion. By this he means that
Plato succeeded in overcoming the mythical, demonic, and orgiastic character of
Greek cults with what he understands as religion proper, i.e., the overcoming of the
ancient cultus and the distinction between sacred and profane within which it
operated.8 “Plato is just the one who changes myth into religion. . . .”9 And then
again, “. . . in Plato’s teaching . . . takes birth . . . something like religion.”10 This
birth occurs, in Patočka’s opinion, in the Phaedo. We could, therefore, say that
religion is born as Socrates dies; that religion is born at the same time as
6

Patočka’s observation on this score is most insightful. After citing Durkheim saying that “[u]nder the
impact of the common wave of enthusiasm, matters wholly secular by nature were transformed into
sacred, as Fatherland, Liberty, Reason,” Patočka then adds:“[t]hat, to be sure, is an enthusiasm which,
for all the cult of Reason, has an orgiastic case.” Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, trans.
Erazim Kohák (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 113. See also Derrida’s reading of Patočka’s essay in The
Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), chapter one
“Secrets of European Responsibility.”
7
Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, xx.
8
“Religion is not the sacred, nor does it arise directly from the experience of sacral orgies and rites;
rather, it is where the sacred qua demonic is being explicitly overcome.” Patočka, Heretical Essays,
101.
9
Jan Patočka, Plato and Europe, trans. Petr Lom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 126.
10
Ibid., 127.
3

philosophy’s emergence as the art of dying. Can we be sure that the religion of
which Patočka speaks, the religion to which Plato gives birth, is still religion and not
philosophy? Or is it a double birth which we witness in the Phaedo, the birth of
religion and its double, namely, philosophy?11
At a first glance, the Phaedo is about neither the death of philosophy nor the
death of God, but simply the death of a philosopher, even if we are to take Socrates
as the embodiment of the philosopher par excellence—a figure if not divine, at least
demonic, as Friedländer argues.12 Yet, in this unique text, which can perhaps be
compared only with the long chapters of Jesus’ testament in the Gospel according to
St John (chapters 13-17), death looms over its pages and it is not only the death of
Socrates. It is, again, a double death: death in philosophy (for it is here that we find
the memorable definition of philosophy as ars mortis), but also death in and because
of religion, that is, sacrifice. These two themes are not of course unrelated, but
rather internally connected, and first and foremost, by the logic of exchange: the one
for the other, the one in place of the other. Implicit here is also a certain hierarchy:
the higher in place of the lower, giving up the lower for the sake of the higher. We
should not fail to notice that this is also the logic that governs sacrifice and that,
therefore, Phaedo opens with the question of the sacrifice of the sacrifice: the old
sacrifice to the orgiastic and demonic (the Minotaur); the ritualized sacrifice in
commemoration of the release from the old sacrifice (the orgiastic becomes
organized); and finally, Socrates’ sacrifice. That last one is double too: Socrates’
sacrifice (execution) by the polis has been preceded by Socrates’ self-sacrifice to a
life dedicated to philosophy.
Recent interpreters of the dialogue have paid considerable attention to the
ritualistic context within which Plato frames Socrates’ last hours.13 His execution
has been delayed on account of a festival in honor of Apollo Delius that
commemorated Theseus’ intervention which had put an end to the annual sacrifice
of fourteen young Athenians offered as sacrifice to the mythical monster Minotaur.
Ancient readers of Plato would have also been aware of the fact that during the
festival, which was known as Thargelia, the city ritualistically purified itself (νόµος
ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν, 58b5-6).14 One of the ways
that the city’s purification was carried out was the expulsion of two of its citizens,
considered as pharmakoi. In earlier times, their expulsion might have taken the form

11

The discussion of religion’s counterfeit doubles in philosophy, and especially Hegel, has been taken
up with mastery in William Desmond’s Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double? (Ashgate, 2003).
12
“There also came a moment [for Plato] where the human master grew into the mythical figure of the
great demon Eros himself.” Paul Friedländer, Plato, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1958), 174.
13
See, among others, Friedländer, (ibid.): “The Phaedo alludes to this area of mystery cults through the
concept of ‘purification,’ signifying the soul’s separation from the body (67c); for cathartic rites are
characteristic of mystic initiation” (p. 71).
14
The identification of Apollo Delius’ festival with Thargelia was supported by Jan N. Bremmer,
“Scapegoat Rituals in Ancient Greece” in Oxford Readings in Greek Religion, ed. Richard Buxton
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 291-2.
4

of a sacrifice.15 The 12th century Byzantine poet John Tzetzes preserves for us
another interesting detail of the ritual:
The (rite of) pharmakos was a purification of this sort of old. If a
calamity overtook the city by the wrath of God, whether it were famine
or pestilence or any other mischief, they led forth as though to a
sacrifice the most ugly of them all as a purification and a remedy to the
suffering city. They set the sacrifice in the appointed place, and gave
him cheese with their hands and a barley cake and figs, and seven times
they smote him with leeks and wild figs and other wild plants. Finally
they burnt him with fire with the wood of wild trees and scattered the
ashes into the sea and to the winds, for a purification, as I said, of the
suffering city.16
Frazer believes that Athens maintained a stock of ugly people to be used precisely as
pharmakoi whenever either the festival or an extraordinary occasion called to do so:
“The Athenians regularly maintained a number of degraded and useless beings at the
public expense; and when any calamity, such as plague, drought, or famine, befell
the city, they sacrificed two of these outcasts as scapegoats.”17
This religious festival to which Plato calls particular attention is supposed to
facilitate the reader in making the connection between Socrates and the heroic
founder of Athens, Theseus. Instead of corrupting the Athenian youth, Socrates, like
Theseus, rescued them. But from what kind of monster? One might suggest their
own ignorance, assuming, therefore, that the interaction with Socrates helped those
young minds to escape the perils of the unexamined life. The answer, however, as
the dialogue itself seems to suggest, is not as simple. Theseus had put an end to a
cruel and unenlightened practice, that of sacrifice, a practice that had been accepted
and perpetuated in the name of religious superstition, and he had done so by means
of his reason.18 If Theseus is a fitting counterpart for Socrates in the analogy that
Plato is trying to establish at the opening of his dialogue, that is because Socrates too
had used his reason to put an end to that very same superstition.19

15

“The character of the pharmakos has been compared to a scapegoat. The evil and the outside, the
expulsion of the evil, its exclusion out of the body (and out) of the city—these are the two major senses
of the character of the ritual. Harpocration, commenting on the word pharmakos, describes them thus:
‘At Athens they led out two men to be purifications for the city; it was at the Thargelia, one was for the
men and the other for the women.’ In general the pharmakoi were put to death. But that, it seems, was
not the essential end of the operation. Death occurred most often as a secondary effect of energetic
fustigation.” Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 130-2 (emphasis in the original).
16
From Tzetzes’ Thousand Histories, quoted by Derrida, in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 133, (my emphasis).
17
Frazer as quoted by Derrida in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 133.
18
Another example of a similar confrontation between humanistic reason and monstrous irrationality is
that of Oedipus and the Sphinx, for more on which see my essay “Thebes Revisited: Theodicy and the
Temporality of Ethics,” in Research in Phenomenology 39:2 (2009): 292-306.
19
See also Ross Romero’s paper “Without the Least Tremor: Ritual Sacrifice as Background in the
5

Religious language and imagery abounds throughout the Phaedo. We read
about epodai, (incantations), teletai (rites), and spondai (libations) and since such
language is not unusual for Plato (I will be examining some examples from his other
dialogues below), it is easy to ignore it and focus on the “arguments.” In “Socrates’
Last Bath,” Douglas J. Steward suggests that the ritual background of the dialogue
should serve as the key that unlocks its interpretation. He summarizes his thesis as
follows: “the whole mise-en-scène of the Phaedo, is the simulation of a telete, a
ritual of initiation and purification practiced by . . . the Orphics.”20 He identifies, as
other scholars have done as well, allusions to specific religious practices that
punctuate the dialogue. Above, however, the various specific examples in which
religion is alluded to, religious practices re-enacted and even parodied, or rather
through them all, a larger picture emerges, that of Socrates as the ultimate sacrificial
victim, the pharmakos par excellence, as notoriously ugly as our sources tell us that
the pharmakoi usually were. Indeed, one of the meanings of Socrates’ proposal in
the Apology (36d), namely, that he deserves to be fed on the city’s expense, assumes
now the more sinister character of a self-identification as a pharmakos. A sacrificial
victim, therefore, that willingly becomes such; who willingly takes and drinks the
pharmakon of hemlock in a moment which, in a Hegelian fashion before Hegel,
would become the point of culmination that would surpass and therefore suppress all
sacrifices.21 In order to complete this picture we need only to add here that he, as
Diogenes Laertius testifies, was born “on the sixth day of Thargelion, the day when
the Athenians purify the city.”22 It seems, therefore, that Plato’s Phaedo has Socrates
dying on the day of his birthday, making the day of his death another, more spiritual
kind of birthday. Out of the death of the son of Sophroniscus a different and yet the
same person emerges, Plato’s speculative Socrates.
I mentioned earlier the Fourth Gospel and in particular St John’s account of
the passion which, as it is well known, differs significantly from that of the
synoptics. To understand John’s narrative of the passion it is important to consider
the timing, the place, and the language he employs in describing it. By placing
Christ’s crucifixion on the day of the feast of the Jewish Passover and indeed at the
very moment when the lambs would have been sacrificed at the temple of Solomon
in preparation for the feast, John succeeds in portraying Christ’s passion as a
mimesis of the Jewish ritual and as a sacrifice, performed outside of the city’s walls
in order to purify Israel. Recall, for example, what the High-priest says in typical
Johannine irony: “it is better for one man to die for the people” (John 11:50). At the

Phaedo,” a paper delivered at the 7th annual meeting of the Ancient Philosophy Society (Boston
College, 12-14 April, 2007).
20
Douglas J. Stewart, “Socrates’ Last Bath,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy 10:3 (July 1972),
253.
21
A slightly more sympathetic reading is offered by Desmond who, however, reaches the same
conclusion that “Socrates is transubstantiated into a sacrificial victim. . . . [h]is death will be a
desecration, like the killing of the criminal as a sacred figure.” See, Beyond Hegel and Dialectic:
Speculation, Cult, and Comedy (New York: SUNY Press, 1992), 90.
22
Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, II, 23; cited also by Derrida,
“Plato’s Pharmacy,” 134.
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same time, however, Christ’s sacrifice becomes the fulfillment and the truth of that
ritual which, once it has been revealed and taken place, renders it inoperative.
Similarly, Socrates’ sacrificial death in the Phaedo is supposed to imitate a
variety of rituals associated with Greek religion, revealing thus their “higher truth”
and, by doing so, overcoming them. In connection with the Phaedo, but also with
the Symposium, Paul Friedländer understands this overcoming precisely in Hegelian
terms when talking of “a sublimation in truly Hellenic spirit of the noblest form of
piety of a people.”23 So what in Greek religion is “naively” understood as a rite that
aims at purifying and, thus, at restoring for the conscience which is aware of itself as
defiled by sin the possibility of a renewed rapport with the divine, becomes in Plato
the lofty ideal of the pursuit of knowledge. “To Plato, however,” Friedländer
continues, “‘purification’ is knowledge or pure thought (φρόνησις).”24
Catharsis (κάθαρσις) means for Plato nothing other than the right way to
philosophize (οὗτοι δ’εἰσὶν [οἱ κεκαθαρµένοι] . . . οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὁρθῶς, 69d).
If we were to exclude the reference to the purifications of Thargelia at the opening
of the dialogue, the theme of purity is first introduced at 66d8 as qualifying the kind
of knowledge that the true philosopher desires, namely, pure knowledge: “It really
has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge [εἰ µέλλοµέν ποτε
καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι] we must escape from the body.”25 To obtain such purity of
knowledge the philosopher must strive to dissociate his soul from his body as much
as possible, effecting a continuous anticipation or rather mortification, during each
and every day of his life, of that separation that will finally occur only at his last
hour. This separation becomes identified as catharsis and lysis later in the text (in
67c5 and 67d4). Lysis (λύσις) here indicates a release from the bodily fetters, as one
is freed from a prison. It was precisely this idea that the image of a Socrates newly
released from his prison chains had anticipated at the opening of the dialogue.
In between those two moments, Socrates shifts the reference of the language
of purification from its literal sense, denoting the purity of knowledge to which the
philosopher aspires and which the body and all its functions prevent, to a purity
understood already in a metaphorical sense, that is, in a strongly religious sense:
[W]e shall be closest to knowledge . . . if we are not infected with [the
body’s] nature but purify ourselves from it [ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωµεν]. . . . In
this way we shall escape the contamination of the body’s folly [οὕτω
µὲν καθαροί] . . . and by our own efforts we shall know all that is pure,
which is presumably the truth, for it is not permitted to the impure to
attain the pure [literally: “it is not lawful for the impure to touch what is
pure”/µὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι µὴ οὐ θεµιτὸν ᾖ] (67a-b).
Purity becomes now a question of complying with the prescriptions of θέµις, τὸ
θεµιτόν, of what is or is not permissible in accordance with the divine law. Thus the
23

Friedländer, Plato, 72.
Ibid., 71.
25
For Phaedo’s English text I use G.M.A. Grube’s translation from John M. Cooper’s Plato: Complete
Works (Hackett, 1997).
24
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contamination of the pure by what is impure is considered as an act of sacrilege
(ἀθέµιτον), the violation of a taboo.26 Yet this purification is not any more of the
body, as it was for the religious rites of which we hear at the opening of the dialogue
and which continue to remain a constant theme and reference in its background, but
rather a purification from the body, as we can now speak—for the first time
perhaps—of a purified mind (διάνοιαν κεκαθαρµένην, 67c4). It becomes selfevident, then, that only such a purified mind can aspire to attain the pure knowledge
which was set earlier in our text as the goal of philosophy. Thus, the question now
becomes a question regarding the ways and the means by which and through which
the philosopher can purify himself from his body. The answer, as we have already
seen, is philosophy itself; philosophy itself is the new ritus (a ritual without ritual, as
it is fitting, perhaps, for this “religion without religion”), the disciplina, which, when
practiced rightly, ὁρθῶς—we will see later what this means for Plato—can ensure
for its adherent the attainment of pure knowledge.
Finally, there is the question of the purity of one’s intentions. For others, like
the philosopher, might display the same philosophical attitude but for the wrong
reasons. Externalities, such as the right decision or the right action, even if they are
right, are only appearances and therefore can hardly be enough to qualify the
philosopher as a true lover of wisdom. What is needed is to turn one’s examining
eye inward toward oneself, to undertake an introspection, thereby discovering—for
the first time perhaps—what will be known from now on as the subject’s interiority,
that is, the true sanctuary where philosophy as pure religion can set its altar (one
could recognize here a characteristically “Lutheran” move). At precisely such a
moment of introspection one feels the birthpangs of conscience.
The famous passage of the Phaedo (80e) . . . describes a sort of
subjectivizing interiorization, the movement of the soul’s gathering of
itself, a fleeing of the body towards its interior where it withdraws into
itself in order to recall itself to itself, in order to be next to itself, in
order to keep itself in this gesture of remembering. This conversion
turns the soul around and amasses it upon itself. It is such a movement
of gathering, as in the prefix syn, that announces the coming-toconscience.27
Does not, however, the much-praised immediacy of the Greeks with their world, the
secret of Greek cheerfulness, come to an end as soon as man becomes hollowed with
the depth of such an interiority to which conscience has opened for itself? And if it
is so, would not Nietzsche be right in accusing Plato of doing precisely this?
Furthermore, is it a coincidence that this return of oneself to oneself that gives birth
to conscience takes place as soon as the world itself—now understood as exterior to
me, exterior to my interiority—has become characterized as impure, guarded, so to
26

The Liddell-Scott defines ἀθέµιτον as lawless and godless. Θέµις describes an act established not by
(civic) law but by custom (=an unwritten law, inspired by the gods).
27
Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, 13.
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speak, by a prohibition against touching it? Recall how Socrates puts it: “it is not
lawful for the impure to touch what is pure” (67b). Conversely, is it also not
unlawful for the philosopher who desires what is pure, and therefore must himself
remain such, to touch what is impure? And does not such cultic taboo, such fear for
defilement, re-inscribe the logic of the old religion, the law of the orgiastic, at the
very foundations of philosophy?
To return to our reading of the text: Socrates exhorts Simmias to undertake an
examination of one’s motivations, an examination of conscience:
If you are willing to reflect on the courage and the moderation of other
people, you will find them strange.
In what way, Socrates?
You know that they all consider death a great evil?
Definitely, he said.
And the brave among them face death, when they do, for fear of greater
evils?
That is so.
Therefore, it is fear and terror that make all men brave, except the
philosophers (68d2-12).
Such are those people who “exchange pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains and
fears for fears” in the way one exchanges money, “the greater for the less like coins”
(69a6-8). Yet, such exchanges, insofar as they do not remain both interior and, at the
same time, superior to oneself, that is, insofar as they do not transcend the bodily
altogether, are nothing more than counterfeits. The “only valid currency for which
all these things should be exchanged is wisdom” (69a9-10). Myth and priestcraft
could make someone appear virtuous by promising worldly or heavenly pleasures
and by threatening with punishments in this life or the afterlife—exchanging, thus,
“pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains and fears for fears.” Against such an
economic exchange of counterfeit money stands the true currency of philosophy—
but, as with every forgery, the challenge is that of differentiation: how to tell the true
philosopher from fake ones and true philosophy from its counterfeit—which is, at
the same time, the question of distinguishing true religion (that is, philosophy) from
counterfeit religion (for Plato and the philosophers, “cultic,” or, as some people may
say today, organized religion).
Such a task belongs to dialectics, that is, the art of division and collection,
about which Socrates admits his love.28 The particular task of distinguishing the true
philosopher through such a process of division is taken up in the Sophist.
Interestingly enough, however, what the philosopher can be confused most easily
28

See, Phaedrus, 266b.
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with are not the Sophists but gods. “Are you bringing a visitor, Theodorus? Or are
you bringing a god?” Socrates asks about the Eleatic stranger at the beginning of the
Sophist. Theodorus replies that his companion is not a god, although divine—“but
then” he goes on to add, “I call all philosophers that.” Socrates’ answer is worth
quoting at length:
And that’s the right thing for you to do, my friend. But probably it’s no
easier, I imagine, to distinguish that kind of person than it is to
distinguish gods. Certainly the genuine philosophers who “haunt our
cities”—by contrast to the fake ones—take on all sorts of different
appearance just because of other people’s ignorance. As philosophers
look down from above at the lives of those below them, some people
think they’re worthless and others think they’re worth everything in the
world. Sometimes they take on the appearance of statesmen, and
sometimes of sophists. Sometimes, too, they might give the impression
that they’re completely insane.29
Philosophy has always operated according to such distinctions, while reserving for
herself the right to regulate them: distinctions between being and non-being,
between true and false, between purity and impurity, between authenticity and
inauthenticity. In the passage above what is at stake is the equivocation between the
true philosopher and what resembles him closely: the statesman, the sophist, the
madman. The potential of misidentification is then compared to the ambivalence that
characterizes the stranger (who, incidentally, is also the neighbor, that is, the one
who resembles me more closely, for if the stranger was wholly strange there would
have been no ambiguity). Is the stranger friend or foe? An enemy or a god? To take
this a step further: how can one tell true gods from fake ones, gods from idols?
Plato’s call to a diacritical hermeneutics remains problematic as the verdict to such
questions belongs to philosophy (to knowledge—ultimately each of these questions
is driven by the desire to know), which had produced these distinctions in the first
place.30
Elsewhere in Plato, however, it is the figure of the priest who bears the family
resemblance to the true philosopher and it is, therefore, against religion that
philosophy must be contrasted as sharply as possible. Thus, in a criticism against
religious Afterdienst—to use Kant’s term of disparagement—of which Kant himself
would have been jealous, Plato has Adeimantus say the following:
Beggar priests and diviners go to the doors of the rich man and
persuade him that the gods have provided them with a power based on
sacrifices and incantations [epodai]. If he himself, or his ancestors, has
29
Sophist, 216c2-d2, translation by Nicholas P. White in Plato: Complete Works. For a discussion of
the peculiar prologue of this dialogue, see John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic
Dialogues, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975 [3rd edition 1996]), 460-464.
30
On diacritical hermeneutics see the work of Richard Kearney and in particular “What is Diacritical
Hermeneutics?” in the Journal of Applied Hermeneutics, (December 2011), 1-14.
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committed some injustice, they can heal it with pleasures and feasts;
and if he wishes to ruin some enemies at small expense, he will injure
just and unjust alike with certain evocations and spells. They, as they
say, persuade the gods to serve them. . . . And they present a babble of
books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring of the Moon and the Muses,
as they say, according to whose prescription they busy themselves
about their sacrifices. They persuade not only private persons, but cities
as well, that thought sacrifices and pleasurable games there are, after
all, deliverances [lyseis] and purifications [katharmoi] from unjust
deeds for those still living. And there are also rites for those who are
dead. These, which they call initiations [teletai], deliver us from the
evils in the other place; while, for those who did not sacrifice, terrible
things are waiting (II 364b-365a).31
Within a few lines, Adeimantus manages to condense almost every aspect known to
us of the religion of his times. Granted, such criticism against religion is delivered in
defense of an unconditional justice, but isn’t it precisely so too with Kant’s
unconditional morality that despairs of the externalities of priestcraft?
The question, however, is not simply philosophy’s criticism of religious
practice, but rather the much more ambitious claim of philosophy’s appropriation of
religion, that is, philosophy’s self-elevation to a new religion, or as Patočka says, “a
new mythology.”32 Was not, after all, such a “mythology of reason,” one of the
objectives quite explicitly demanded by The Oldest System Program of German
Idealism?33
In the well-known palinode from the Phaedrus, Socrates enumerates three
kinds of madness that are meant to demonstrate how the fourth kind, namely, eros,
is also a divine gift beneficial to men. It is interesting to notice that all three
madnesses mentioned at the following passage are aspects of the traditional Greek
religion.
The prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona are out of their
minds when they perform that fine work of theirs for all of Greece,
either for an individual person or for a whole city, but they accomplish
31

The Republic, II 364b-365a, (Allan Bloom’s translation). As James Adam comments, “Plato agreed
with the more enlightened section of his countrymen in condemning such degrading cults and
superstitions on the ground of their immoral tendency.” The Republic of Plato, volume I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1963), 81 (my emphasis).
32
In Heretical Essays, 106.
33
“First of all I will speak here of an idea which, as far as I know, has never occurred to anyone
before—we must have a new mythology, however, this mythology must be in the service of ideas, it
must become a mythology of reason [eine Mythologie der Vernunft].” Trans. Dennis J. Schmidt in On
Germans and Other Greeks (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 85. This short text, first
published by Rosenzweig in1917, although written in Hegel’s handwriting, is attributed to Hegel,
Schelling, and Hölderlin alike. For a (somewhat uncritical) commentary on it, see David Farrell Krell,
The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing of God (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2005), 16-44.
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little or nothing when they are in control of themselves. We will not
mention the Sybil or the others who foretell many things by means of
god-inspired prophetic trances. . . . Next, madness can provide relief
from the greatest plagues of trouble that beset certain families because
of their guilt for ancient crimes: it turns up among those who need a
way out; it gives prophecies and takes refuge in prayers to the gods and
in worship, discovering mystic rites and purifications. . . . Third comes
the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses, which takes a
tender virgin soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of songs and
poetry.34 (244b-245a)
Here are then prophecy, ritual, and music, or, as perhaps it would be better
understood, hymnology—all and each of them aspects of religious practice. The
remaining of the palinode, via the great story of the heavenly journey of the soul’s
chariot, will try to demonstrate how eros fits in this scheme of such God-given
passions. The reader cannot but wonder why philosophy is not included as one of
the four divine madnesses. In the Phaedrus alone, we have seen the philosopher
being in love, not only with sophia, whose professed lover by definition he is, but
also with the beautiful youth, in this case with Isocrates; we have seen him purifying
himself for the offense committed against Eros (243a3: καθήρασθαι ἀνάγκη; 243a4:
καθαρµὸς ἀρχαῖος); we have seen him identifying himself as a prophet (242c3: εἰµὶ
δὴ οὖν µάντις), delivering oracles to Lysias (278b7-278e4) and a prophecy
concerning Isocrates’ future (278e10, µαντεύοµαι); and we have seen him speaking
almost in dithyrambs (238d3), possessed by the nymphs like a true poet (238d:
νυµφόληπτος), or giving the palinode in the name of a poet (244). Philosophy is then
not missing from the list of the divine madness, rather it is the hyper-madness that
encompasses and recapitulates in itself all of them, just as Socrates reveals himself
as, at once, lover, poet, prophet and priest.
“We have to see Plato’s rationalism,” Barrett observes “not as a cool scientific
project such as a later century of the European Enlightenment might set for itself,
but as a kind of passionately religious doctrine—a theory that promised man
salvation from the things he had feared most from the earliest days, from death and
time.” And he continues “[t]he extraordinary emphasis Plato put upon reason is
itself a religious impulse.”35
The moves in the operation of substitution that Plato sets in motion can be
confusing: the philosopher deems himself as the true priest and then he establishes
the criteria and the critique that denounces the priest as a fake philosopher-priest.36
34
Phaedrus, 244b-245a, in Alexander Nehamas’ and Paul Woodruff’s translation (in Plato: Complete
Works).
35
William Barrett, Irrational Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 84.
36
Ancient sources make reference of a “priestly” Plato as well. Thus, the Augustan historian Dionysius
of Halicarnassus in his Epistula ad Pompeium shares the observation made by the fourth-century BC
renowned critic Demetrius Phalereus and, as he says, “by many others and often” that there is much of
a priest in Plato’s style: καὶ πολὺς ὁ τελέτης ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις παρ’ αὐτῷ, ὡς καὶ Δηµήτριος ὁ
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But here lies the trap: for the philosopher-priest is already a fake priest—a selfproclaimed and (self-)idolized priest and thus truly an idol—and therefore the
philosopher’s exposé of religion as a false image of philosophy (see, superstition,
Afterdienst), negates a negation, affirming thus what should have been evident all
along, namely, that only the priest is a priest.
If my suspicion that in Plato’s philosophy we find more than a philosophy in
the “narrow” sense (such as that whose limits Kant’s Critiques clearly delineated),
or better yet, a philosophy within which religion has been sublated—aufgehoben—
and therefore now it poses itself as a higher form of religion, then we can appreciate
the irony of the accusation which philosophy traditionally directs against religion.
That is the derision of historical or revealed religion for being a counterfeit service
to God—Afterdienst in the language of both Kant and of the Oldest System Program
of German Idealism—cannot but be returned to philosophy, ever since the latter
donned religion’s garb and proclaimed itself as “worship of god” (λατρείαν τοῦ
θεοῦ) or Gottesdienst.37 Indeed, it went as far as considering philosophers “like a
consecrated priesthood, set apart and offered up as a sacrifice [in the very Socratic
fashion that the Phaedo illustrates] to the spirit.”38
Monotheism of Reason, Polytheism of Imagination
I have attempted to sketch the basic lines of the operation that seeks to replace
historical religion by such a hierophantic philosophy as the one found in
Platonism—an operation of replacement, inaugurated by Plato, but carried on by his
Neo-Platonic epigones down to Hegel, Schelling and beyond. One needs to follow
attentively the intricate layers of readings here: on the one hand, Patočka’s reading
of Plato, especially in the fifth of his Heretical Essays, and, on the other hand,
Derrida’s reading of Patočka’s essay in his “Secrets of European Responsibility”—
for this is an exchanging of sacred secrets over the centuries. Let us begin by a
Φαληρεὺς εἴρηκέ που καί ἄλλοι συχνοί. Epistula ad Pompeium, II, 228, in Opuscula, ed. Hermann
Usener and Ludwig Radermacher (Teubner, 1899), as quoted by Friedländer in Plato, 367. Indeed,
Plato’s philosophy as religion comes complete with all the doctrinal points one might be expected to
find in a religion. First and foremost the cult of the executed founder: “One might possibly say today
that, instead of re-forming the old myths of his people, [Plato] created the myth of Socrates.”
Friedländer, Plato, 172. “The greatest Platonic myth is the myth about Socrates as the representative of
the gods, who carries out his divine commission through examination.” Patočka, Plato and Europe,
128. One also finds a cosmogony (as in the Timaeus), a cosmology and cosmological geography (as in
the Phaedo), various versions of eschatology (as in the Gorgias, the Phaedo, and the Republic) as well
as the ritualistic repetition of epodai, only now prayers have become transformed into arguments. See,
for example, Socrates’ exhortation that the arguments about the immortality of the soul “should be
repeated like epodai.” Phaedo, 77e, 114d.
37
The self-proclamation of philosophy as worship (Gottesdienst) belongs to Hegel’s Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion: One Volume Edition, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson
and J.M. Stewart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 194. For a discussion of this theme,
see the second chapter in Desmond’s Beyond Hegel and Dialectic, as well as the second chapter in
Desmond’s Hegel’s God. Hegel follows here too Plato who defines philosophy as a “worship of god”
(λατρείαν τοῦ θεοῦ) already in the Apology (23c).
38
The reference is to Hegel’s remarks from the Science of Logic, paraphrased by Desmond in Beyond
Hegel and Dialectic, 87.
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passage from Derrida’s essay in which Derrida outlines carefully the operation of
replacement which Patočka identifies in Plato’s work, most notably in the Phaedo,
as we have already seen, but also in the famous allegory of the cave from The
Republic. “This presentation,” Patočka writes, “especially in its dramatic part, is a
reversal of the traditional mysteries and of their orgiastic cults.” And he continues:
Those cults already aimed if not at a fusion, then at least at a
confrontation of the responsible and the orgiastic. The cave is a
remnant of the subterranean gathering place of the mysteries; it is the
womb of Earth Mother. Plato’s novel idea is the will to leave the womb
of Earth Mother and to follow the pure “path of light,” that is, to
subordinate the orgiastic entirely to responsibility.39
We need only keep two points from this reading: Plato’s coming out of the
subterranean cave—a symbol and topos of the old religion—constituting, at the
same time, a reversal and a subordination of the old religion by the new philosophycum-religion that places itself under the light of the Apollonian sun. What is
paradoxical, however, in this attempt to leave the maternal womb/cave of religion
(and, thus, we return to this image of birth, of Plato giving birth to religion or
philosophy, one is never quite sure) is that Plato does not quite succeed, if we
assume that that was his intention anyway, to leave behind entirely the cave but
somehow re-instituting the cave’s role or function on a higher plane. Thus “the
Platonic anabasis does not provide a passage from orgiastic mystery to
nonmystery,” as one might have expected, but rather, as Derrida continues,
it is the subordination of one mystery by another, the conversion from
one secret to another. For Patočka calls the Platonic conversion that
turns an eternal gaze towards the Good a “new mystery of the soul.”
This time the mystery becomes more internal, it takes the form of an
“interior dialogue of the soul.” Although it does correspond to a first
awakening of responsibility by means of the soul’s relation to the
Good, this coming-to-conscience still retains its mystical element; it
still takes the form of a mystery, this time unacknowledged,
undeclared, denied.40
This mystical element, the mystery or the mysterious, both re-instituted and denied
by philosophy, does not hold under its spell only Plato but extends, in Derrida’s
reading, to Hegel, and even as far as Heidegger.
Like those which will follow Plato’s anabasis throughout a history of
responsibility that capitalizes on secrecy [Derrida does not name them
here explicitly but hints at them], the first conversion still retains within
39
40

Patočka, Heretical Essays, 104.
Derrida, The Gift of Death, 8.
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it something of what it seems to interrupt. The logic of this
conservative rupture resembles the economy of a sacrifice that keeps
what it gives up. Sometimes it reminds one of the economy of sublation
[relève] or Aufhebung.41
Thus, we have arrived at Hegel whose ghost Derrida evokes often in his reading of
Patočka’s essay. Yet it does not stop with Hegel. In a paragraph that traces the
substitution of religion by philosophy far beyond Plato—although, in an essential
way, it always remains within the space and the inheritance of Platonism—Derrida
outlines for us the genealogy of sacred secrecy all the way to the inner sanctum of
Heidegger’s Being and Time:
That very idea, namely, this melete or epimeleia [for and toward one’s
death, as discussed in the Phaedo] that one can rightly translate by
“care” or “solicitude,” opens the vein—and begins the vigil—within
which will be inscribed the Sorge (“care”) in the sense Heidegger
confers on it in Being and Time. In particular let us think of the
moment when Heidegger, following the tradition of the cura but
without naming Plato, evokes nothing more than the solicitudo of the
Vulgate, Seneca, and the merimna of the Stoics, . . . which, however,
like the Platonic melete, also signifies care, concern, and solicitude.42
Thus, this story of replacement and substitution, which, more or less, overlaps with
what we know as the history of philosophy, comes to be summarized by the
“economy of a sacrifice that keeps what it gives up.”43 A sacrifice in the literal sense
of sacer facere, of making sacred what has been desacralized, consecrating it again,
but this time in the name of a new good, in the service of a different deity; but also a
sacrifice in the sense we have already encountered at the opening scene of the
Phaedo. We have come full circle to those crucial first pages of the narration of
Socrates’ last hours, confirming now that the operation that these pages set in
motion, an operation we have described in detail, permeates not only the Platonic
work but philosophy as such. The “economy of sacrifice” meant in the Phaedo three
distinct transformations of the theme of sacrifice, culminating with the sacrifice of
sacrifice as subsumed in the (sacrificial) discipline of philosophy.
As we look back to the scene of Socrates’ sacrifice, I would like to remind the
reader that Plato has always placed Socrates under the auspices of Apollo. It is
during Apollo’s holiday that the death of Socrates takes place. What Socrates offers
as sacrificial victim to his patron god is nothing else than the orgiastic, that is, the
Dionysian: the Minotaur slaughtered in the darkness of the labyrinth, the amazing
darkness that he elsewhere recognizes inside himself when he compares himself to
another chthonic monster, that of the Typhon (Phaedrus, 230a4). However,
41

Ibid., emphasis in the original.
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precisely because the economy of sacrifice “keeps what it gives up,” the Dionysian,
orgiastic, demonic, and chthonic element is very much retained and, at times, it
resurfaces under different guises, in Neo-Platonic theurgy, for example, in the
Renaissance’s fascination with magic (Paracelsus), but also with mathematics
(Galileo),44 in the sacralization of the profane during the Enlightenment, and the
religion of aesthetics to which German Idealism devoted itself.45
How philosophy itself becomes a “new mythology,” having first turned itself
against the old mythology and replaced it—even if that means only the
“subordination of one mystery by another, the conversion from one secret to
another”46—is explained by the mechanism of incorporation which, like that of
digestion, the original and literal form of incorporation, seeks to turn what is outside
to inside, interiorize the exterior, and assimilate the heterogeneous. According to
Patočka, Platonism does precisely this when it incorporates the “traditional
mysteries” of Greek religion and, in particular, its “orgiastic practices,” by reversing
them, “elevating” them, and finally appropriating them: “Because of this
incorporation that envelops demonic or orgiastic mystery, philosophy remains [even
at its highest, most speculative moments] a sort of thaumaturgy.”47 One detects in
that last reference a scorn that means to remind us of how, historically, Platonism
degenerated into theurgy at the hands of such thinkers as Iamblichus and Julian the
Apostate. Such degeneration, of course, could not have been for Plato anything less
than a betrayal of his efforts or, better yet, the revenge that the orgiastic takes in the
form of a return of the concrete and the external, despite its sublation at the hands of
the philosopher. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that all aspirations in
elevating philosophy as “true” religion usually succeed at nothing more than turning
philosophy into a sect. This is the insight of Nietzsche’s keen perception when he
writes:
Among the Greeks several attempts to found new Greek religions
failed—which speaks for the higher civilization of the Greeks even in
rather early times. It suggests that there must have been in Greece at an
early time large numbers of diverse individuals whose diverse needs
and miseries could not be taken care of with a single prescription of
faith and hope. Pythagoras and Plato, perhaps also Empedocles, and
much earlier yet the Orphic enthusiasts, aimed to found new religions;
and the first two had souls and talents that fitted them so obviously for
the role of religious founders that one can scarcely marvel enough that
they should have failed. Yet all they managed to found were sects.48
44

Patočka draws the connection between the two phenomena in their common ancestry: “Galileo is,
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“Religion is love of beauty” was Hölderlin’s memorable definition at the Hyperion.
46
Ibid., 8.
47
Ibid., 15.
48
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The attempt to found a new religion, or better yet, philosophy’s attempt to establish
itself as a religion in place of religion—always, of course, as a “religion without
religion”49—is always the same, even if at one time it emerges “among the Greeks”
and another among the Germans. Yet, each time one can easily foresee Nietzsche’s
unheeded prophesy coming to pass. One such notorious effort was the ambitious
program voiced in a particularly epic tone by the Oldest System Program of German
Idealism:
At the same time we so often hear that the great masses must have a
sensuous religion. Not only the great masses, but the philosopher needs
it too. Monotheism of reason and heart, polytheism of the imagination
and of art—this is what we need.50
The two terms, polytheism and monotheism, should not confuse us. They have
nothing to do with any form of theism, except, perhaps, with atheism.51 Indeed,
between these two positions, which are artificially posed here as antithetical only so
that they can later be declared as unified, there is no room for God, nor indeed for
any kind of real transcendence, since, as the same text had made explicit, we
“cannot seek either God or immortality outside” ourselves. Intellectual monotheism
and aesthetic polytheism are, at bottom, two sides of the same coin of atheism. They
are juxtaposed, rather cunningly, as two polarities which the philosophy of the new
epoch to dawn must unite. That new epoch is, of course, anything but new, and
rather quite ancient: it is indeed the vision of ancient Greece that is described here
and the unity to be achieved between reason and the senses is nothing else than that
old “unity” of Apollo (monotheism of reason) with Dionysus (polytheism of the
imagination). Yet, as Olympiodorus’ Commentary to Phaedo reminds us, Apollo is
only the unification of Dionysus’ scattered reflection, thus one can hardly talk of a
real unity of opposites here.52
Indeed, philosophy is nothing more than the sobering of the orgiastic, the
Apollonian mask of Dionysus. “The same hand stages orgies and organizes
49
An allusion to John Caputo’s last chapter On Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
Whether the post-modern “turn to religion” continues both faithfully and successfully the philosophical
supersession of religion in a manner after Plato and Hegel, as discussed here, is the work of another
day, even though an apparent continuity—from pre-modern Plato to post-modern Derrida through the
modern Hegel—can be safely assumed.
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Translated by Dennis J. Schmidt in On Germans and Other Greeks, 85. See also note 32 above.
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everydayness.”53 The orgiastic is essentially boring, its holy mania fed by the
unattainable desire to escape itself, its own boredom. Like Hegel’s unhappy
consciousness,54 the Dionysian is torn in and by itself. Yet, once it unhappiness is
overcome in the “unity” that something like the self-determination of the Oldest
System Program affords it, its Apollonian happiness is “masking the religious
misery of its own delusion with self-determinating immanence.”55 Truly, then,
“[p]hilosophy isn’t something that comes to the soul by accident,”56 it is rather
something to which the soul arrives naturally. That man is, by nature, the
“metaphysical animal” is only symptomatic of his orgiastic origins, which, like
Oedipus, the metaphysician par excellence, insists on denouncing or forgetting.
Accordingly, metaphysics is not any less orgiastic than the orgiastic itself,
metaphysics is not any less blind than the blindfolded initiate to the mysteries—no:
its blindness is its presupposition, yet, a presupposition that goes unacknowledged.
Such duplicity within the philosophical endeavor tears philosophy between the
denied, yet all-too-alive, orgiastic, and its allegiance to the Apollonian sun.
Philosophy, thus, becomes the unhappy consciousness itself, yet nothing could
reconcile it to itself, as the only thing that could, namely, religion, has been
appropriated by that suffering philosophy herself.
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